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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JODY G. ROBINSON,
Case No. 20090007-CA

Petitioner and Appellee,
vs.
EVERETT D. ROBINSON,
Respondent and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103
(2) (h) because it is an appeal from a district court domestic relations case.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The burden is on the Appellant in this action to show that the trial court
committed reversible error. The Respondent alleges that the trial court erred in
many ways but fails to demonstrate reversible error in any of his arguments. This
Court should affirm the lower court's ruling on that ground and also because the
Respondent failed to file a timely objection in the lower court to the
Commissioner's recommendation. Such a failure constitutes an affirmative waiver
of his right to object to the recommendation on appeal. The Respondent also failed
to properly preserve the issues for appeal in the lower court.
1

Additionally, the Respondent objects in his brief to the factual findings of
the trial court. As laid forth below, this Court should not disturb the trial court's
factual findings because the Respondent did not marshal evidence for an against
the trial court's factual findings. The Respondent alleges that the issuance of the
final protective order was in error on many different grounds; however, all of
those arguments are flawed. Furthermore, the trial court granted the protective
order on many bases, any one of which would be independently sufficient to
justify entry of the final protective order. For the foregoing reasons and for the
reasons stated below, this Court should affirm the decision of the lower court.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
BECAUSE THE RESPONDENT DID NOT OBJECT TO THE
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION AND BECAUSE HE
DID NOT PROPERLY PRESERVE THE ISSUES FOR APPEAL.
A. THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY OBJECTION
TO THE COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Section 7 (g) provides as follows:
Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A
recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of the court
until modified by the court. A party may object to the
recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner as filing
a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made in open
court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under
advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is
served.
In regard to the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the Utah State Legislature has said,

"If the hearing on the petition is heard by a commissioner, either the petitioner or
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respondent may file an objection within ten days of the entry of the recommended
order and the assigned judge shall hold a hearing within 20 days of the filing of the
objection." Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.3 (2009).
If the Respondent fails to object within ten days to a Commissioner's
recommendation, a Judge enters a final judgment in the matter in accordance with
the Commissioner's recommendation. Buck v. Robinson, 2008 UT App 28, Tf 12,
177P.3d648.
The Respondent concedes that he did not file an objection within ten days
to the Commissioner's recommendation. (Appellate Br. at 25.) In an unpublished
2005 decision, this Court ruled that where an Appellant failed to object to a
Commissioner's recommendation, this failure "may have operated as an
affirmative waiver of his defenses to [the Petitioner's] motion." Thomas v.
Thomas, 2004 UT App 240, Fn 1, (unpublished). Based on the Respondent's
failure to file a timely objection, this Court should not consider his appeal to the
issuance of the underlying protective order.
The Respondent did file an objection to the protective order, though not an
objection to the Commissioner's recommendation, with the trial court on January
8, 2009 (Appellant's Addendum, Ex. M) on the day after his Notice of Appeal was
filed with this Court. Because this was not a timely-filed objection to the
Commissioner's recommendation but rather a generalized objection to the format
of the final protective order and other grievances, this does not satisfy the statutory
requirement that the Respondent file his objection within ten days or that the
3

issues for appeal must be specifically raised.
B. THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESERVE THE
ISSUES FOR APPEAL.
In a recent case, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that '"To preserve an
issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the trial court/'
because "a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue."' Odea v.
Plea, 2009 UT 46, ^ 18, citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847
(Utah 1998). In order to properly preserve an issue at the district court, the
following must take place, "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the
issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority. Badger, 966 P.2d at 847.The Respondent
failed to preserve issues for appeal by failing to file a timely objection to the
Commissioner's recommendations. Additionally, he didn't object with specificity
to the Commissioner's recommendation that a permanent protective order enter.
His January 8, 2009 objection is to the format of the final protective order and the
Commissioner's authority to adjudicate protective order proceedings, not to the
Commissioner's recommendation that the Petitioner is entitled to a permanent
order. (Appellant's Addendum, Ex. M.) The Respondent did not wait for the trial
court to rule on this objection before filing his Notice of Appeal. Applying the
Badger test above, the Respondent failed to properly preserve the issues for
appeal. IdL

4

II.

THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE
TRIAL COURT.
The Respondent alleges that his due process rights under the United States

Constitution and/or the Utah State Constitution were violated in at least three
different ways as described under his headings A (1) (a)-(c). (Appellant's Br. at
22-28): (1) The Respondent alleges that he did not receive a copy of the proposed
final protective order prior to its signing and that it was broader than the
Commissioner's bench recommendation; (2) The Respondent alleges that the
Commissioner lacked authority to issue the protective order; and (3) the protective
order process violated Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-201(l) (a) thus violating his
right to due process under the law.
In each section, the Respondent alleges that his due process rights were
violated but does not cite the United States Constitution or other statutory or case
authority, nor does he explain how his due process rights were violated.
An Appellant alleging a due process violation has the obligation to state the
"contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented . . . , with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R.
App. P. 24(a) (9); Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT App 283, % 11,191 P.3d 1242. This
Court has also stated, "While failure to cite to pertinent authority may not always
render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so when the overall analysis of the
issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing
court." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). In this case, the Court
5

cannot properly analyze the alleged due process violations because they were not
adequately briefed by the Respondent.
The Respondent seems to argue in his Appellant Brief sections A (1) (a)-(b)
that the Court committed reversible error separate from the alleged due process
violations; therefore, those two arguments are addressed more specifically below.
A. A FAILURE TO MAIL THE PROPOSED FINAL PROTECTIVE
ORDER OUT FOR OBJECTION WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
In his Appellant's brief, the Respondent objected to the entry of the
December 19, 2008 Protective Order, stating that he was denied due process by
the trial court because he was given no opportunity to review and object to the
Protective Order before it was signed by the Judge. (Appellant's Br. at 22.) The
Respondent alleges that he should have been served with a copy of the proposed
order prior to its submission to the court. He further alleges that reversible error
was committed because the final Protective Order allegedly included seven
provisions not ordered by Commissioner Patton at the November 7, 2008 hearing
date.
The Respondent failed to cite legal authority showing that a failure to send
a proposed Order out of objections pursuant to Rule 7 (f) (2) of the Utah Rules of
Procedure is reversible error. This Court has stated:
[T]o permit meaningful appellate review, briefs must comply with
the briefing requirements sufficiently to enable us to understand ...
what particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record
those errors can be found, and why, under applicable authorities,
those errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other relief.
6

State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, ^ 13, 52 P.3d 467. Even if the Court considers
the facts in the light most favorable to the Respondent and assumes he did not
receive a copy of the proposed order before it was signed, he has failed to show
that this is reversible error, and this Court should affirm the lower court's ruling.
The Respondent also alleges that the final protective order contained seven
"enlargements or discrepancies" that favored the Petitioner. (Appellant's Br. at
23.) The Petitioner disagrees that there were enlargements or significant
discrepancies between the Commissioner's November 17, 2008 bench ruling and
the final protective order. Any discrepancy that exists between the two is so minor
as to render it "harmless error," which as defined by this Court "is an error that is
sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected
the outcome of the proceedings." State v. Spillars, 2007 UT 13, ^ 24, 152 P.3d
315.
B.

THE ISSUANCE OF THE FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER DID NOT
VIOLATE THE UTAH RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
SECTION 6-304.
The Respondent alleges that in issuing a final protective order after a

hearing on November 17, 2008, Commissioner Patton exceeded the authority
delegated to domestic commissioners by Rule 6-401 of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration. (Appellant's Br. at 25.) The Respondent states, " . . . there is
nothing on the record to show that someone other than Commissioner Patton made
the final adjudication of the Second Protective Order, which would be required if
7

the District Court were to comply with UJCRJA 6-401 (4) (a)." (Id)
In Buck v. Robinson, 2008 UT 28,177 P.3d 648, this Court found that a
district court Commissioner may constitutionally take evidence, make proposed
findings, and issue a recommendation to be acted upon by a Judge in a protective
order proceeding. Id. at *f 12. Such functions "do not include nondelegable core
judicial functions." Id The Respondent concedes that Judge Taylor signed the
November 17, 2008 minute entry in which the Commissioner found that the
Petitioner was entitled to a permanent protective order. The Respondent also notes
that the final protective order was signed by both Commissioner Patton and Judge
Laycock. (Appellant's Br. at 25.) The Court followed proper procedure by having
district court Judges make a final adjudication of the protective order. This Court
should affirm the lower court's ruling.
The Respondent also argues that Commissioner Patton had an obligation to
inform him that the Commissioner's order was a "recommendation" and that by
not doing so, the Commissioner failed to give the Respondent proper notice so that
he could object within ten days. (Appellant's Br. at 26.)
The Commissioner does not have an affirmative duty to inform the
Respondent of procedural matters of which the Respondent should already have
been aware. No such requirement exists in the statute and the Respondent cites no
authority in support of this contention.
"As a general rule, a party who represents himself will be held to the same
standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar [.]" Nelson
8

v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). Despite this, courts are generally
lenient with pro se litigants "because of their lack of technical knowledge of law
and procedure." Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, Tf 3, 67 P. 3d 1000. In an
unpublished decision where a former attorney appealed his criminal conviction ,
the Utah Court of Appeals found that even affording that leniency, the Appellant's
issues on appeal were inadequately briefed, and stated, "We do note that
Defendant is not in the same position as most pro se litigants in that, as a disbarred
attorney, he is law trained." State v. Schwenke, 2007 UT App 354, Fn 1,
(unpublished).
Similarly, the Respondent in this case is a recent law school graduate, has
passed the Utah State Bar Examination, and could reasonably be expected to
acquaint himself with the applicable rules and statues when appearing pro se.
III.

THIS COURT SHOULD DISREGARD THE RESPONDENT'S
CHALLENGES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT.
Rule 24 (a) (5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the

Appellant to provide "a statement of the issues presented for review, including for
each issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority." This Court
may disregard or strike briefs that do not comply with Rule 24. Utah Rules of
App. Proc. §24 (k) (2009).
In his listing of nine issues for appeal in pages 6-12 of his Appellant's
Brief, the Respondent does not question the validity of the issuance of the
underlying protective order, except by implication in issue number five where he
9

questions whether the entry of a plea in abeyance in a criminal domestic violence
case can "constitute grounds that domestic violence has occurred." (Appellant's
Br. at 9.) Because the Respondent did not include the issue of whether the issuance
of the underlying protective order was valid, he did not indicate to the Court where
he may have preserved that issue for appeal.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that an appealing party's
brief provide either, "(A) [a] citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court; or (B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an
issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24 (a) (5) (A)-(B); Odea v.
Oley, 2009 UT 46, 53. In challenging the validity of the issuance of the final
protective order, the Respondent neither cited to the record showing where the
issue was preserved nor did he state other grounds for review. Due to the
Respondent's non-compliance with Rule 24, the Petitioner motions this Court to
disregard his Argument Section A (2) entitled "The grounds for the Protective
Order are insufficient" except for Section A (2) (a) "plea in abeyance," which was
properly included in the issues section of the brief in compliance with Rule 24 (a)
(5).

A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY CONSIDERING THE
RESPONDENT'S ENTRY OF A PLEA IN ABEYANCE IN A
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE.
At the protective order hearing on November 17, 2008, the Commissioner
stated:
When I review the file, what does not seem to be disputed is that Mr.
10

Robinson has entered a plea in abeyance on a criminal charge of
domestic violence. That does not seem to be disputed. That in and of
itself would be sufficient for the entry of a protective order.
However, the Court is not relying only on that.
(Appellant's Addendum, Ex. J at 3).
The trial court did not err by relying upon the Respondent's entry of a plea
in abeyance as one of the grounds for entering a permanent protective order on
November 17, 2008. But even if the trial court had erred in considering the
Respondent's entry of a plea in abeyance to his domestic violence charges, this
Court should still uphold the entry of the permanent protective order because it
was entered upon multiple grounds, any of which would have independently
justified the entry of a permanent protective order.
The trial court did not err by considering the Respondent's entry of a plea
in abeyance on the criminal charges the resulted from one of the major incidents
upon which the request for protective order was based. The Respondent attempted
to cite Rule 410 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to Support the contention that a
plea of "nolo contendere" cannot be admitted as evidence against the defendant
making the plea. (Appellant's Br. at 30.)
According to the Appellant's Addendum, the Respondent entered pleas of
"no contest- plea in abeyance" to the charges of assault and three charges of
domestic violence in the presence of a child. (Ex. K at 9.) A plea of "no contest—
plea in abeyance" is not the same as a plea of "nolo contendere." The former plea
can be properly considered by the Court.
11

In the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act found in Utah Code Annotated
Section 76-36-1.1 (3) (2009), the statute says in regard to enhancement of criminal
charges due to previous convictions of domestic violence charges:
For purposes of this section, a plea of guilty or no contest to any
qualifying domestic offense in Utah which plea is held in abeyance
under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a
conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or
dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement.
According to the state legislature, in a closely analogous context, a plea in
abeyance, even if it is coupled with a plea of "nolo contendere," is the equivalent
as a conviction for other purposes under the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.
The same reasoning should apply to the entry of a protective order based on a plea
in abeyance. For those two reasons, the Commissioner properly considered the
Respondent's plea in his criminal case.
B. THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE TO
PROPERLY CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL
FINDINGS.
The trial court entered the permanent protective order on November 17,
2008 based partially on its finding that the Respondent had violated the Modified
Ex-Parte Protective Order, agreed to by the parties on May 13, 2008. The
Respondent disputes the Commissioner's finding that he had violated the Ex-Parte
Order. (Appellant's Br. at 31-34.)
The Respondent disagrees with the trial court's interpretation of the
Modified Ex-Parte Protective Order and its findings that he had violated the Order.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "A court's interpretation of its own order is
12

reviewed for clear abuse of discretion and we afford the district court great
deference." Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15,1f 9, 179 P.3d
786.
The trial court made detailed and well-reasoned findings in support of its
finding that the Respondent had violated the Modified Ex Parte Protective Order:
Let me go back and state I also note that she has also indicated that
he has violated the temporary protective order from the earlier case
by moving back into the home and refusing to leave her and the
children alone while in the home . . . I am also looking at paragraph
3, property orders. It is clear and unmistakable that it says that
Petitioner, the Petitioner is Jody Robinson, is awarded use, control
and possession of the Parties' home .. .The Respondent shall not
interfere with Petitioner's use of said property but is not prohibited
from non-interfering use. Which is what he has pointed out. But he
cannot interfere with her use, control and possession. That's what he
cannot interfere with because that's what she was granted. And it
goes on: the intent of this provision is to allow the respondent to
continue to care for the Parties' property, participate in family events
at the home, and other circumstances as mutually agreed upon by the
parties. Which is also clear that if there is not mutual agreement, he
has no authority to interfere with her control, use or possession. It
would be his burden to convince the court that she was in mutual
agreement. It is readily apparent that she was not, on many
occasions.
(Appellant's Addendum, Ex. M at 3.)
In his Appellant's brief, the Respondent restates the arguments he made
before the trial court as to his interpretation of the Modified Ex-Parte Protective
Order. He does not offer any authority to support his position. He does not marshal
evidence to dispute the trial court's finding that he violated the ex-parte order. "In
order to successfully challenge factual findings such as these, an appellant must
first marshal all of the evidence that supports the findings and then demonstrate
13

that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the district court, the evidence is
insufficient to support the finding." Matter of Estate of Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343,
1350 (Utah 1994). If a Respondent fails to marshal evidence, the appellate courts
will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact. Id,
The Respondent's challenges to the trial court's findings throughout his
brief are flawed by a failure to marshal evidence, including the section of the
Appellant's brief in which the Respondent attempts to challenge the trial court's
finding that he placed his wife in fear of imminent harm. Because the Respondent
made no attempt to marshal facts but merely restated his arguments before the trial
court, this Court should not consider his challenges to the trial court's factual
findings.
IV.

THE FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER IS NOT OVERBROAD.
The Respondent's third major argument seems to be that the final

protective order was overbroad. He alleges that the final protective order violated
Utah Code Annotated Section 62A-4a-201 (1) (b), which the Respondent stated
bars the judiciary from "protecting the wife and children" with anything beyond
the least restrictive means or alternatives available. (Appellant's Br. at 43.) The
Respondent's arguments are based on a misreading of the statute cited above and
the Cohabitant Abuse Act. Further, the Respondent reargues the same facts he
argued before the trial court. He spends a great deal of time trying to prove that the
Petitioner does not need protection from him. Despite this, he does not marshal
evidence nor properly present argument that the trial court's factual findings were
14

erroneous. Once again, a failure to marshal means the Court will not disturb the
trial court's factual findings. Id
In State v. Hardy, an appellant attempted to challenge the protective order
statute, alleging that it was unconstitutionally overbroad because the statute
prohibited even "innocent speech" between the parties. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,
Tf 16, 53 P.3d 645. In its decision, the Court emphasized the state's significant
interest in protecting "the health and well-being of its citizens" and that the
issuance of a protective order is necessary in certain cases to protect that interest.
IdL at f 17. The Court explained that the protective order statute is not overbroad:
Although subsection 30-6-4.2(2) (b) appears to sweep broadly
because it allows courts to prohibit all communication between two
people, the statute is actually quite narrowly crafted. Before a
protective order may issue, a court must first conclude that the
parties to the protective order are cohabitants, and that a cohabitant
has been "subjected to abuse or domestic violence, or ... there is a
substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse or domestic
violence." Id. Without the particular relationship of "cohabitants"
and without previous instances or the "substantial likelihood" of
domestic violence or abuse, the court may not restrict the protective
order respondent's right to speak and associate freely. Id. Thus, we
conclude that section 30-6-4.2 is not impermissibly overbroad
because it is narrowly drafted to "burden no more speech than
necessary to serve a significant government interest." Madsen, 512
U.S. at 765, 114 S.Ct. at 2525. Consequently, we also conclude that
section 76-5-108, which provides criminal penalties for violating a
protective order, is also not overly broad.
Id
Similar reasoning applies to this case; the protective order statute has been
narrowly drafted to provide safety to the protected persons. The Respondent is
restrained from attempting or committing abuse against any of the protected
15

persons and from contacting the Petitioner. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-106 (2) (a)(b). The Respondent is not restrained from contacting his children or from
exercising parent-time with the children. The portion of the permanent protective
order that issues orders pertaining to child custody and parent-time expires in a
maximum of 150 days from issuance or upon further order of the court. Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-7-107 (6) (a) (2009). This is to ensure that the Respondent's parental
rights are properly adjudicated in the correct family law action rather than in a
protective order. The protective order statute is not overbroad, nor does it violate
Utah Code Annotated Section 62A-4a-201 (1) (b).
V.

THE RESPONDENT CANNOT OBTAIN A PROTECTIVE ORDER
AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN THIS ACTION,
The Respondent also attempts to appeal the trial court's denial of his

Request for Protective Order, filed pro se by the Respondent under the Petitioner's
Protective Order case numbers. The Respondent never filed his own, separate
request for protective order under a separate case number. He filed under his
wife's two protective order case numbers. (Appellant's Addendum, Ex. G at 1.)
Utah Code Annotated section 78B-7-108 (2009) requires: (1) A court may not
grant a mutual order or mutual orders for protection to opposing parties, unless
each party: (a) has filed an independent petition against the other for a protective
order, and both petitions have been served.. ."
Because the Respondent filed his petition for protective order in the wrong
case, the trial court did not issue a temporary protective ordered and, accordingly,
16

the Petition was never served with a temporary protective order. The Respondent
is clearly not entitled to a protective order to issue under the Petitioner's protective
order case numbers.
CONCLUSION
The Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court affirm the lower court's
entry of a final protective order. The Respondent's brief failed to show that the
lower court committed reversible error at any point in its adjudication. Further, the
Respondent failed to properly object to the Commissioner's recommendation in
the lower court and to preserve the issues for appeal before this Court. He failed to
marshal evidence in his attempts to challenge the lower court's factual findings,
and those factual findings should not be disturbed. The Commissioner's
recommendation that the Petitioner was entitled to a protective order in the court
below was well-reasoned and supported by substantial evidence and findings of
fact. This Court should affirm the lower court's ruling.

DATED, this ^

day of ^ep^mheT, 2009.

*IS)rteiW»,k'flJtftiortr
Patricia K. Abbott
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
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I certify that on this ;y>>

day of ^mkmber , 2009,1 served a copy of

the attached Appellee's Brief upon Everett D. Robinson, Respondent/Appellant,
by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the
following address:
Everett D. Robinson
Respondent/Appellant
P.O. Box 1047
American Fork, UT 84003
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